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Taxes, Cigarette Consumption,  
and Smoking Intensity: Reply†
By Jérôme Adda and Francesca Cornaglia*
The economic literature has long established the positive relationship between cig-
arette taxes, prices, and cigarette consumption. Recently, attention has been brought 
to the fact that the behavior of smokers may offset the consumption effect of a tax 
increase (Adda and Cornaglia 2006). In a later contribution Abrevaya and Puzzello 
(2012)—henceforth, AP (2012)—re-examined Adda and Cornaglia’s (2006)—hence-
forth, AC (2006)—analysis using a larger sample from the same source and have cast 
some doubts on the robustness of AC’s (2006) analysis. In particular, they claim that 
the limited within-state tax variation observed in the dataset does not lead to precise 
cigarettes and cotinine tax-elasticities estimates. AP (2012) also argue that the use of 
the appropriate statistical inference leads to a further decrease in the precision of AC’s 
(2006) estimates.
In this reply, we show that the intensity of smoking, defined as the ratio of cotinine 
levels to the number of cigarettes smoked, does respond to changes in excise taxes 
as previously found by AC (2006). We do so by using a dataset that spans from 1988 
to 2006, allowing for more variations in taxes than in AC (2006) and in AP (2012) 
who both considered the period 1988–1994. We also stress the importance of con-
sidering the appropriate timing of taxes when analyzing their effect on smoking. AC 
(2006) and the replication of their results in AP (2012) used contemporaneous taxes, 
while we make the case for using lagged taxes.
We also make a number of other contributions to the literature on smoking behav-
ior and tobacco control. First we show that smoking intensity responds to price 
changes over this period, and that consistent estimates require the use of instru-
mental variables because of endogeneity issues. We show that OLS estimates are 
biased toward finding no effects. We find that the tax elasticity of smoking intensity 
is significantly different from zero and equal to 0.07 and that the price elasticity is 
higher, at around one. We also find considerable heterogeneity in the response to tax 
increases across different groups, and notably across different race groups. 
We then investigate whether biomarkers such as cotinine measures are informative 
of long-run outcomes. We provide supporting evidence using the Coronary Artery 
Risk Development in Young Adults (CARDIA) study. This dataset follows smok-
ers over a period of 15 years, with information on cigarette consumption as well as 
cotinine levels, a biomarker of smoking. The panel nature of the CARDIA study 
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allows us to investigate long-run effects that repeated cross-sectional data such as 
NHANES do not. We show that cotinine levels are a strong predictor of smoking 
cessation, over and above the number of cigarettes smoked. We finally use this data 
to shed further light on dynamic selection, and its potential to bias OLS regressions 
of smoking intensity on changes in prices and taxes. 
We first present, in Section I, new evidence of compensatory behavior in response to 
tax changes. In Section II, we present effects of prices on smoking intensity. Section III 
shows that cotinine measures are significant predictors of long-run outcomes. Finally, 
Section IV investigates the potential for dynamic bias due to sample selection.
I. Smoking Intensity and Taxes
In this section we provide evidence of a link between taxes and smoking intensity. 
We first discuss four different issues relevant to the estimation, namely the need 
for an extended dataset, the importance of the timing of taxes, the use of weights 
when analyzing data from the NHANES dataset, and the issue of clustering of the 
standard errors.
A. Extended Data 1988–2006
AP (2012) expand the original NHANES III dataset (1988–1994) used by AC 
(2006) adding more states over the same period. A difference between the two datasets 
is the inclusion of tobacco states. These states are characterized by higher cigarette 
consumption, lower taxes, and little variation in excise taxes over the period consid-
ered. Essentially, when including these states, the effect of taxes on smoking intensity 
becomes much smaller.1 AP (2012) observe that one needs sufficient variation in taxes 
within states to be able to identify the parameter of interest. This is certainly the case, 
and in a context of regressions which include state fixed effects, it is important to 
expand the data to add more time variation. The NHANES data have expanded over 
the years and more waves are now available for analysis, covering a period which has 
seen more variation in prices and excise taxes than the early 1990s. We supplement 
the NHANES III dataset used by AC (2006) and AP (2012) with later waves between 
1999 and 2006. This data have been used by Adda and Cornaglia (2010)—henceforth, 
AC (2010)—to investigate the effect of smoking bans and excise taxes on nonsmok-
ers. In this paper we analyze the effect of taxes on smoking intensity. 
Table 1 presents some demographic characteristics for the samples 1988–1994 
and 1988–2006. The extended sample is slightly older and there is a lower preva-
lence of white individuals as well as individuals who do not have a high school 
degree. The number of cigarettes consumed per day (conditional on smoking) is 
very similar in both samples. The same is true for cotinine concentration. The advan-
tage of the expanded dataset is the greater coverage of American states, going from 
26 to 35, and especially the increased number of state-year observations, on which 
relies the identification of the tax effects in the difference-in-difference method we 
employ. This number increases from 60 to 147. Adding the years to 2006 improves 
1 See AP (2012), Table SM10 in the online appendix.
3104 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMbER 2013
the  analysis greatly as there has been lots of variation in taxes between 1988 and 
2006, and allows, as pointed out by AP (2012) to better identify the parameter of 
interest. For a further description of the dataset, we refer the reader to AC (2010). 
B. Timing of Taxes
A main difference between AC (2006) and our subsequent work on the effect of 
excise taxes on smoking behavior, as in AC (2010), is the issue of the timing of taxes. 
Our original work related smoking intensity in a given year to the contemporaneous 
tax level. However, the contemporaneous tax refers to the tax at the end of the fiscal 
year at the end of June. In addition, the tax measure we use is the real one, which is 
constructed using the nominal rate, deflated using the end of the year inflation rate. In 
contrast, measures of smoking are collected throughout the civil year in the NHANES 
survey. Using contemporaneous taxes is therefore problematic as a large fraction of 
the sample is imputed a tax, which does not apply to them yet. This is why AC (2010) 
used the lagged tax in their specifications. Acknowledging the short-comings of using 
contemporaneous taxation as in AC (2006), we use lagged taxes to correct for the 
mismatch between the interview date and the relevant tax measure. 
C. Sampling Weights
In this section we address the issue of the use of sample weights in regressions involv-
ing NHANES data. AP (2012) follow DuMouchel and Duncan (1983) who show that 
differences between coefficients in weighted and unweighted regressions are a sign 
of mispecification. As pointed out in DuMouchel and Duncan (1983), this is however 
only true when weights are derived from exogenous variables. The weighting scheme 
in NHANES is more complex. The weights are a function of demographic  variables 
Table 1—Descriptive Statistics: NHANES
NHANES 1988–1994 NHANES 1988–2006
Observations 3,514 6,452
Age 42.1 43.3
(16.0) (15.8)
Male, percent 53.8 54.2
White, percent 61.4 58.1
African-American, percent 36.0 30.6
High school dropouts, percent 45.4 41.6
High school degree, percent 33.0 31.3
Number of cigarettes per day 16.2 16.2
(11.3) (10.9)
Cotinine level ng/ml 232.5 232.2
(141.5) (135.0)
Number of states observed 26 35
Number of years observed, per state 2.3 4.2
(1.6) (3.4)
Number of state × year observations 60 147
Number of observations, per state 218.9 329.5
(165.5) (256.0)
Notes: Standard deviations in parenthesis where appropriate. Unweighted means are displayed.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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because the survey oversampled certain categories such as age groups or racial groups. 
In addition, the weights were constructed to take into account non-participation, espe-
cially for the medical exam from where the cotinine measure is taken. Hence, the 
weights are also a function of the endogenous variables. This is why the National Center 
of Health Statistics (NCHS) strongly recommends to use weights in the analysis (we 
refer the reader to the NHANES guidelines (NCHS 1996) for a detailed description). 
AC (2006) overlooked this issue, but AC (2010) use them in their regressions. 
Table 2 shows empirical evidence that the sample weights are indeed correlated 
with the outcome variable, over and above demographic characteristics. The table 
displays the correlation between the outcome variable of our regressions and the 
weights ( p-values in parenthesis). We distinguish between three outcome variables, 
the log number of cigarettes smoked per day, log cotinine concentration, and log 
smoking intensity. The correlation between these three outcome variables and the 
sample weights varies between 0.1 and 0.27 in the sample 1988–1994, and between 
0.1 and 0.22 in the extended sample (1988–2006). Once we control for a set of observ-
able characteristics, which include age, sex, race, education, region of residence, and 
year of examination, the correlation is closer to zero but statistically different from 
zero. The correlation ranges between 0.05 and 0.15 in the sample 1988–1994 and 
from −0.02 to 0.07 in the extended sample. The results show that the sample weights 
are indeed correlated with the endogenous variable, even when a set of demographic 
controls are included. The problem is particularly severe in the sample used by AP 
(2012), but less so with the extended dataset we use in this article. In the presence 
of endogenous stratification, the assumptions in DuMouchel and Duncan (1983) 
are violated. As discussed in Maddala (1983), the use of weights is recommended 
instead. However, the right way to adjust for endogenous weighting is not obvious 
and we leave this to future work. When using data from NHANES in this reply, we 
present the results with and without weights for comparison with previous results. 
D. Computation of the Standard Errors
AP (2012) rightly point out that the standard errors should be clustered at state level 
only, rather than at state times year level, following the findings of Bertrand, Duflo, 
Table 2—Correlation between Sample Weights and Smoking Behavior
NHANES 1988–1994 NHANES 1988–2006
log number of cigarettes 0.27** 0.15 ** 0.22** 0.07**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
log cotinine 0.10** 0.11** 0.10** 0.05** 
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)
log smoking intensity −0.24** −0.05** −0.13** −0.02*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07)
Observations 3,514 3,514 6,318 6,318
Controls No Yes No Yes
Notes: p-values in parenthesis. Controls include age, age squared, sex, race, education, state of 
residence, and year indicators. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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and Mullainathan (2004). This is the case because of potential serial correlation in the 
error term within states. AP (2012) show that clustering has an effect on the precision 
of the estimates. Going from a state-year clustering to state clustering alone, tends to 
increase the standard errors of the coefficients, although a subset of them decreases 
(see Table 1 in AP 2012). In contrast, AC (2006) used clustering at state-year level. We 
adopt the more robust methodology below, clustering at state level only.2
E. Estimation Results
We now turn to the behavioral effect of taxes. We first note that there is a differ-
ence in focus between AC (2006) and AP (2012). AC (2006) are interested in the 
existence of compensatory behavior, which amounts to testing whether the ratio of 
cotinine to cigarettes is significantly related to taxes. In other words, the focus is on 
whether the tax elasticity of cigarettes is larger than the tax elasticity of cotinine. The 
fact that smoking intensity responds to public policies is an important finding for 
the design of health policies. As argued in AC (2006), this also has consequences on 
the estimation of popular models such as the rational addiction model. AP (2012), 
on the other hand, mainly test whether the elasticity of cotinine or cigarettes with 
respect to taxes or prices is significantly different from zero. It is of course possible 
that both the elasticities of cotinine and of cigarettes smoked are insignificant— 
perhaps because of lack of variability in the data—and that the elasticity of the 
intensity of smoking is significantly different from zero. 
AC (2006) provide results for various specifications, including conditioning on 
onset of smoking or cotinine levels, to address the issue of dynamic selection. We 
present the regressions of the baseline specification, for the subset of smokers who 
started smoking before age 17. We return to the dynamic selection issue in Section IV. 
Table 3 displays the results of OLS regressions of smoking intensity (defined as 
the ratio of cotinine and the number of cigarettes smoked), the number of cigarettes 
smoked and cotinine levels, on log state taxes as well as demographic variables, 
state indicators and year indicators. All left-hand-side variables are log transforma-
tions for ease of interpretation. 
The table has four columns of results, the first two using the contemporaneous tax 
as a regressor, the following ones using the lagged tax instead. In both cases, the table 
displays results for the sample 1988–1994 and the extended sample 1988–2006. In 
addition, the table has two panels, where we use unweighted and weighted regressions. 
NHANES III and the subsequent NHANES surveys differ in the amount of demo-
graphic variables which were recorded. NHANES III has a wider set of explana-
tory variables. To make our results consistent across the table, we control for a set 
of variables which are present throughout all waves. These controls are age, sex, 
race, and education levels. AC (2006) also controlled for occupation, household 
size, and passive smoking, and in some cases for the time of examination and height. 
However, there is little reason why these additional controls should be correlated 
with state taxes, especially when the regressions include state and year fixed effects. 
2 Note that AC (2010) rely on such inferences as well. Furthermore, AP (2012) also use a bootstrap based method 
to correct the standard errors along the lines of Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008), because the number of clusters 
in their data is small. In this paper, this approach is of less relevance as the number of clusters is considerably higher.
3107AddA And CornAgliA: TAxes And smoking inTensiTy: rePlyVol. 103 no. 7
Indeed, the results in AC (2006) show that the coefficients of interest are not signifi-
cantly different when including a fuller list of controls. 
Table 3, column 1, confirms the results obtained by AP (2012).3 Unweighted 
regressions for the period 1988–1994 show that a one percent increase in taxes leads 
to a 0.03 percent increase in smoking intensity, but this elasticity is not statistically 
significant. When using the extended data (column 2) the elasticity of smoking inten-
sity increases to 0.05, but is still not significant. Column 3 displays the results when 
lagged taxes are used instead. Unsurprisingly, the standard errors are smaller and 
the point estimates larger. The elasticity of smoking intensity is 0.06 in the 1988–
1994 sample and 0.07 in the extended sample, significantly different from zero at 
the 5 percent confidence level. This number is smaller than the one obtained in the 
NHANES sample in AC (2006), but in line with the results in the same paper when 
using data from NHANES 1999–2000. The second panel uses the weights provided 
in the NHANES dataset. The use of weights appears to be of particular importance 
in NHANES III, as the elasticity of smoking intensity is larger than the unweighted 
one, equal to 0.13 and 0.23 respectively, using either contemporaneous or lagged 
taxes. The second elasticity is significantly different from zero. Finally, on the larger 
sample, the use of weights appears to be less important, as we find a very simi-
lar tax elasticity of smoking intensity, equal to about 0.07 percent and s tatistically 
3 The results in Table 3 differ somewhat from those in AP (2012) as we use a different set of controls. For 
instance, the dataset does not record occupation in all years, nor the time of examination.
Table 3—Tax Elasticity of Smoking Intensity, Number of Cigarettes,  
and of Cotinine: Baseline
NHANES
1988–1994
NHANES
1988–2006
NHANES
1988–1994
NHANES
1988–2006
Contemporaneous tax Lagged tax
Unweighted regressions
Elasticity smoking intensity 0.034 0.051 0.062 0.074**
(0.13) (0.046) (0.055) (0.035)
Elasticity number of cigarettes 0.072 −0.035 −0.001 −0.070
(0.20) (0.046) (0.088) (0.051)
Elasticity, cotinine 0.105 0.016 0.060 0.005
(0.13) (0.026) (0.057) (0.030)
Weighted regressions
Elasticity smoking intensity 0.13 0.04 0.227** 0.0691**
(0.14) (0.04) (0.089) (0.029)
Elasticity number of cigarettes 0.059 −0.005 −0.059 −0.089**
(0.22) (0.044) (0.132) (0.044)
Elasticity, cotinine 0.19 0.036 0.168* −0.020
(0.19) (0.028) (0.095) (0.038)
Observations 3,514 6,318 3,514 6,318
Notes: All regressions control for age, sex, race, education, year, and state effects. Robust stan-
dard errors clustered at state level. Regression results displayed in columns 1 and 2 use the con-
temporaneous tax as a regressor, whereas those in columns 3 and 4 use lagged taxes.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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 significant at the 5 percent confidence level. Note that we also find a significant tax 
elasticity for the number of cigarettes smoked (−0.09 percent), but cotinine levels do 
not respond much to changes in taxes. In the remainder of the paper, the analysis uses 
lagged taxes as an explanatory variable for the reasons detailed above.
As discussed in AC (2006), an OLS regression could overstate the effect of taxes 
on smoking intensity because of a dynamic selection bias, where light smokers could 
be more responsive to changes in taxes and quit smoking at a higher rate. As a robust-
ness check AC (2006) used a subsample of smokers who started early (before age 17) 
and who are therefore less likely to quit. We repeat this analysis in Table 4. Column 1 
uses the sample period used in AP (2012). None of the elasticities using unweighted 
regressions are significantly different from zero. With weights, we find evidence of a 
significant effect of taxes on smoking intensity. With the larger dataset (column 2), 
the results are in line with Table 3 and the original results of AC (2006). A 1 percent 
increase in excise taxes increases smoking intensity by about 0.1  percent (this is the 
case in both weighted and unweighted regressions). The increase in smoking intensity 
is the outcome of a significant decrease in the number of cigarettes smoked, and not 
the effect of taxes on cotinine concentration. These results suggest that the findings on 
the whole sample of smokers is not due to a change in the composition of smokers. We 
present further evidence on this issue below in Section IV.
F. Heterogeneous Effects
Table 5 presents evidence of heterogenous effects. We estimate the tax elastic-
ity of smoking intensity for various subgroups of smokers. We find evidence that 
Table 4—Tax Elasticity of Smoking Intensity, Number of Cigarettes, 
and of Cotinine: Early Starters
NHANES
1988–1994
NHANES
1988–2006
Unweighted regressions
Elasticity smoking intensity 0.081 0.097**
(0.067) (0.037)
Elasticity number of cigarettes −0.022 −0.105**
(0.093) (0.050)
Elasticity, cotinine 0.059 −0.009
(0.086) (0.031)
Weighted regressions
Elasticity smoking intensity 0.205** 0.109**
(0.077) (0.033)
Elasticity number of cigarettes 0.084 −0.126**
(0.134) (0.060)
Elasticity, cotinine 0.280** −0.016
(0.118) (0.046)
Observations 2,060 3,611
Notes: All regressions control for age, sex, race, education, year, and state effects. The regres-
sions exclude smokers who started after age 17 and use lagged taxes as a regressor. Robust 
standard errors clustered at state level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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 compensatory behaviors are more important for men than for women, and in partic-
ular more substantial for African-Americans than for whites. AC (2006) found evi-
dence that African-Americans smoke cigarettes more intensively than other racial 
groups. It appears that they are also more reactive to tax changes. There is not much 
evidence of a change in the elasticity by age groups. None are significantly different 
from zero at the 5 percentage confidence level. One reason for this is that sample 
sizes are becoming smaller when one stratifies the sample in such a way, showing 
the limits of such an exercise. 
Finally, smokers with income below the median income (defined as $26,500 
annual income in 2000 dollars) have a higher elasticity than those above the median. 
The elasticities vary from 0.1 to 0.05. This result is in line with the predictions of 
the model in AC (2006). 
II. Smoking Intensity and Prices
AC (2006) did not provide price elasticities for two reasons. First, there is an 
endogeneity issue to which we will come back below. Second, from a public health 
point of view, states and governments can only manipulate prices through taxes, so 
the knowledge of the elasticity with respect to taxes is important to shape policy. 
AP (2012) write that an OLS regression can recover consistent estimates of price 
elasticities, arguing that endogeneity is not a problem with micro data. We dispute 
this argument. First, the regression is indeed using micro data, but the real variation 
is at the state times year level, as argued by AP (2012) in their discussion about 
standard errors. Second, in the presence of aggregate (state) shock to demand, it is 
likely that tobacco companies change their prices to respond to such shocks. The 
fact that the influence of individuals is too small to affect prices is not the issue. 
In the presence of endogeneity, an OLS regression would tend to produce coef-
ficients which are biased toward zero. A positive demand shock would induce an 
endogenous increase in prices, which would counteract the causal effect of prices 
on demand. To solve the issue of endogeneity, we instrument prices with arguably 
Table 5—Smoking Intensity: Tax Elasticities for Different Subsamples
Coefficient SE Sample size
Full sample, 1988–2006 0.069** (0.029) 6,318
Men 0.105** (0.039) 3,423
Women 0.049 (0.045) 2,895
White 0.053 (0.039) 3,690
Black 0.193** (0.075) 1,943
Ages 17–29 0.085 (0.06) 1,464
Ages 30–44 0.075* (0.041) 2,167
Ages 45+ 0.062 (0.043) 2,687
Below median income 0.110** (0.055) 2,919
Above median income 0.058* (0.034) 3,399
Notes: Sample: Regressions control for age, sex, race, education, state of residence, and year 
of interview. The results reported use the lagged excise tax. All regressions are weighted using 
NHANES sample weights. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by state. Median 2000 
income is $26,500. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, NHANES 1988–2006.
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exogenous tax shocks. Taxes are often changed to raise revenue and not to counter 
demand shocks.
In Table 6 we report estimates of price elasticities. The first column displays OLS 
results, without sample weights in the first panel, and with weights in the second. 
The OLS results are similar to those found in AP (2012), and consistent with the 
intuition detailed above. None of the elasticities are significantly different from 
zero. The second column displays instrumental variable estimates. We also report 
the F-statistic for the first stage, which has a value of 57. This indicates that state 
excise taxes are a significant predictor of prices, over and above state and year indi-
cators. The instrumental variable estimates show that smoking intensity responds to 
price changes. Without sample weights, we find that a 1 percent increase in prices 
leads to a 0.76 percent increase in smoking intensity, significant at the 10 percent 
level. When sample weights are used, we find a price elasticity of smoking intensity 
of 1.06, significantly different from zero at the 5 percent confidence level.4 The table 
also displays an F-test for the endogeneity of prices, which we carried out for the 
regressions involving smoking intensity. They show that the null of no endogeneity 
is strongly rejected, at a confidence level of 2 percent. 
4 The price elasticity of the number of cigarettes varies from 0.1 to −0.9 depending on the estimation method and 
the weighting we use. Some of our estimates are outside the range commonly found in the literature, which is typi-
cally between −0.25 and −0.5. Note however, that given the precision of our estimates, they are not significantly 
different from any number within that range.
Table 6—Price Elasticity of Smoking Intensity: Number of Cigarettes and Cotinine
OLS IV
Unweighted regressions
Elasticity smoking intensity 0.062 0.761*
(0.336) (0.418)
Elasticity number of cigarettes 0.101 −0.245
(0.501) (0.577)
Elasticity, cotinine 0.164 0.517
(0.377) (0.418)
F-statistic first stage; ( p-value) — 57.12; (0.00)
F-test of endogeneity; ( p-value) — 10.99; (0.02)
Weighted regressions
Elasticity smoking intensity 0.393 1.056**
(0.397) (0.455)
Elasticity number of cigarettes −0.514 −0.891*
(0.313) (0.492)
Elasticity, cotinine −0.121 0.165
(0.365) (0.407)
Number of observations 4,870 4,870
F-statistic first stage; ( p-value) − 57.12; (0.00)
F-test of endogeneity; ( p-value) − 10.99; (0.002)
Notes: All regressions control for age, sex, race, education, year, and state effects. The results 
reported use lagged prices or taxes. Prices are instrumented with state tax levels. Robust stan-
dard errors clustered at state level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, NHANES 1988–2006.
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III. Long-Run and Short-Run Measures of Smoking
It has been argued (AP 2012) that the number of cigarettes smoked per day is a 
long-run measure of smoking whereas cotinine levels are a short-run measure. It is 
not clear what justifies such a categorization, especially when only cross-sectional 
data is at hand in NHANES. Following this view, AP (2012) dismiss the measure of 
smoking intensity constructed by AC (2006), that is, the ratio of cotinine extracted 
per cigarette smoked. We dispute this claim and present two arguments in favor of 
considering cotinine measures a long-term measure of smoking (and health).
The first one is the one developed in AC (2006). They present evidence of long-
run health outcomes which are linked to the way cigarettes are smoked. We refer 
the reader to the discussion about lung cancer rates by race in the United States, in 
Section IIB in AC (2006). 
Here we provide further evidence using data from the Coronary Artery Risk 
Development in Young Adults (CARDIA) study. These data allow us to follow 
the same smokers over time, in contrast with the cross-sectional nature of the 
NHANES dataset. 
The CARDIA data were collected between 1985 and 2001 in four locations in 
the United States (Alabama, Illinois, Minnesota, and California). A group of 5,115 
individuals aged 18–30, were followed over 15 years, which provides ample longi-
tudinal variation. In each wave the survey asks a number of questions on smoking 
behavior, whether the individual is still smoking at the time, and if not, the age at 
which smoking cessation took place. We define age at smoking cessation as the age 
of the first recorded quit, whether the individual relapses after that period or not. 
We therefore only consider one smoking spell per smoker. In addition, the survey 
records the number of cigarettes smoked in all waves, cotinine levels in the first 
wave as well as the age of smoking initiation. Table 7 presents key descriptives of 
the dataset, and we refer the reader to Friedman et al. (1988) for a detailed descrip-
tion of this dataset. 
We measure the propensity to quit as a function of both the number of cigarettes 
smoked and the cotinine levels at baseline in 1985. We estimate a duration model, 
using a Cox proportional form, where we stratify by geographical location, sex, race, 
education, and age at smoking onset. The data provide us with information on 11,073 
observations following 1,459 smokers until they quit or are right censored. We nor-
malized both the number of cigarettes and the cotinine levels to have mean zero and 
variance one, so that we can interpret the coefficients in a straightforward way. 
Table 8 displays the results. We find that the number of cigarettes smoked per 
day is not significant at the 5  percent level, but interestingly, cotinine levels are 
a highly significant predictor of quitting behavior (column 1). Controlling for the 
number of cigarettes, a one standard deviation increase in cotinine levels at base-
line decreases the likelihood to quit by 49 percent. Moreover, holding cotinine lev-
els constant, a one standard deviation increase in cigarettes is associated with a 
decrease of 2  percent in the likelihood of quitting. Hence the statement that cotinine 
is only a short-run measure of smoking does not appear to be grounded in facts as it 
significantly predicts quitting over a period of 15 years. 
We also explored heterogenous effects. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 8 present the 
effect of cotinine and the number of cigarettes on quitting behavior by sex. Men and 
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women differ in their propensity to quit. In particular, cotinine levels play a bigger 
role for men than for women. 
IV. Dynamic Selection
An important issue refers to dynamic selection, whereby smokers who quit fol-
lowing an increase in taxes may come disproportionally from a low smoking inten-
sity group. This issue has been raised by both AC (2006) and AP (2012). If this is the 
case, an OLS regression of smoking intensity on excise taxes may find a spurious 
positive effect due to a change in composition in the pool of smokers. AC (2006) 
investigate this point in two ways. They first include in their sample individuals who 
Table 7—Descriptive Statistics: CARDIA Sample 
All individuals at 
baseline (year 0) Year 15
Year 15 
individuals
still smoking
Observations 1,546 923 633
Smoking prevalence, percent 100 68.5 100
Mean number of cigarettes 13.1 9.2 13.4
(9.1) (10.0) (9.5)
Mean number cigarettes at baseline 13.1 13.4 13.8
(9.1) (9.5) (8.9)
Mean cotinine level at baseline ng/ml 224.4 222.2 241.1
(158.4) (153.8) (152.1)
Male, percent 47.2 45.3 47.0
White, percent 57.1 52.9 60.5
African-American, percent 42.8 47.1 39.5
Mean age 25.0 40.0 40.0
(3.6) (3.6) (3.6)
Mean years of schooling 12.8 13.0 12.8
(2.0) (2.0) (1.9)
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis where appropriate.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, CARDIA data.
Table 8—Hazard Rates for Quitting Smoking
All Men Women
Number of cigarettes −0.021 0.183 −0.153
(0.077) (0.115) (0.11)
Cotinine levels −0.493** −0.598** −0.445**
(0.093) (0.162) (0.114)
Observations 1,459 691 768
Time at risk 11,073 5,418 5,655
Notes: Cox proportional regression. Age is the analysis time. Stratified by sex (first column), 
race, education, state, year and age at smoking onset. Number of cigarettes and cotinine levels 
have been normalized to mean zero and variance one for ease of interpretation.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, CARDIA data.
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are less likely to quit, for instance individuals who started smoking at a young age, 
to explore the effect of taxes on smoking intensity. Second, they use an econometric 
technique developed by Manski (1994), to use worst case bounds. However, with 
only cross-sectional data this point could not be fully addressed as the bounds tend 
to be large. Using the panel data from CARDIA, we now present new evidence on 
this issue, which helps to interpret the results in AC (2006), and those in Table 3 in 
this article. 
We estimate the effect of tax changes on quitting behavior and whether the effects 
vary with smoking intensity, measured as the ratio of cigarettes to cotinine levels at 
baseline. Using geographical information on the center of examination, we merge 
information on excise taxes to the original CARDIA data. We therefore have varia-
tion on taxes across years and geographical location, which we exploit to estimate a 
model of the duration to quitting.
Table 9 presents the effect of taxes on quitting, for the whole sample, as well 
as for smokers divided into two groups, below or over the median smoking inten-
sity measured at baseline in 1985. The first panel displays the results, controlling 
for age, sex, race, education, state of residence, and a quadratic time trend. We 
find a significant effect of taxes on quitting behavior. A doubling of the excise tax 
increases the likelihood of quitting by 63 percent. Interestingly, the point estimate 
of this effect is larger for individuals with a high smoking intensity than for a low 
smoking intensity. The former have a likelihood of quitting of 56 percent and the 
latter of 93 percent. However, the estimation is not precise enough to conclude that 
the difference between the two is significant. The second panel includes year fixed 
effects rather than a quadratic trend. We get qualitatively similar results, although 
with much less precision.
The results of this exercise suggest that the dynamic bias may not be of such 
importance, and that OLS regressions do not overstate the effect of taxes on smok-
ing intensity. Understanding why individuals with higher smoking intensity may be 
more likely to quit when taxes increase is an interesting question that we leave to 
future research.
Table 9—Effect of State Tax on Quitting by Level of Smoking Intensity
All Intensity < median Intensity > median
Controlling for year and year square
log tax 0.629** 0.557** 0.930**
(0.230) (0.295) (0.409)
Controlling for year fixed effects
log tax 0.380* 0.231 0.693
(0.239) (0.311) (0.434)
Observations 1,477 857 616
Time at risk 11,185 6,475 4,698
Notes: Cox proportional regression, stratified by sex, race, education, state, and age at smok-
ing onset. Regressions include year either through a quadratic specification or through year 
fixed effects.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, CARDIA data.
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V. Conclusion
Considering a dataset that spans from 1988 to 2006 we show that the intensity of 
smoking, defined as the ratio of cotinine levels to the number of cigarettes smoked, 
responds to changes in excise taxes as previously found by Adda and Cornaglia 
(2006).
We also show that smoking intensity responds to price changes and that consis-
tent estimates can be obtained using instrumental variables because of endogene-
ity issues. We find a significant effect of the tax elasticity of smoking intensity 
(0.07) and a price elasticity of around one. We also find considerable heteroge-
neity in the response to tax increases across different groups, and notably across 
different race groups. 
We then provide supporting evidence that biomarkers such as cotinine are infor-
mative of long-run outcomes. Using a dataset that follows smokers for over 15 years 
we show that cotinine levels are a strong predictor of smoking cessation, over and 
above the number of cigarettes smoked. Finally we use this longitudinal dataset to 
shed light on the issue of dynamic selection, and the potential bias of OLS regres-
sions of smoking intensity on changes in prices and taxes.
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